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114 Cal.App.2d 624
In ro WHITE'S GUARDIANSHIP.
ely. 7426.
Sac. 5866.

District Oourt of Appeal, Third District,
California.

March 29, 1948.
I. Guardian and ward

~25

Evidence supported probate court's order terminating minor child's paternal
grandmother's guardianship of child and

awarding his custody to his mother on
grounds that guardianship was no longer
necessary. that mother was proper person
chi1d~s

statute to remove guardian and appoint
another guardian for any of causes mentioned therein. Probate Code, § 1580,
subd.8.
6. Guardian and ward

~25

On mother's petition for termination
of her minor son's guardianship by his
paternal grandmother On ground that guardianship was no longer necessary and for
award of child's custody to petitioner on
ground of child's welfare, probate court
retained authority to determine what was
for child's best interest and to. award his
custody accordingly. Probate Code, § 1580,
subd.8.

custody, and that award of cus- 7. Guardian and ward ¢:::>25
A court having jurisdiction to grant
Probate Code, § 1580, subd. 8.
letters of guardianship has jurisdiction to
revoke them. Probate Code, § 1580, subd. 8.
2. Guardian and ward c1P25
The District Court of Appeal, on ap- 8. Guardian and ward ~25
A probate court, appointing guardian
peal from probate court's order terminating
minor child's paternal grandmother's guard- of minor child's person and estate, retains
ianship of child and awarding his custody continuing supervisory jurisdiction over
to his mother, is bound by probate court's estate's affairs and guardian's handling
fIndings on conflicting evidence as to moth- thereof, and removal of guardian for stater's fitness for child's custody. Probate trtory reasons rests within jSuch court's
broad discretion. Probate Code, § IS80,
Code, § 1580, subd. 8.
subd. 8.
3. Guardian and ward ¢:::>25
When guardianship of minor child is 9. Guardian and ward ~29
no longer necessary, probate court, on petiA parent or other relative of minor
tion of child's parent for termination of child under guardian's control may seek
guardianship, with adequate proof of peti- child's custody by petition.
tioner's fitness for child's custOdy and best
10. Guardian and ward <8=>25
interest of child, may' a ward custody to such
A probate court, which originally grantparent in exercise of sound discretion, and
ed letters of guardianship of minor child's
District Court of Appeal may not interfere
person and estate, retained jurisdiction to
with such determination, in absence of
terminate guardianship as no longer necesabuse of discretion. Probate Code, § 1580,
sary and to award child's custody to his
subd. 8.
mother on her petition. Probate Code, §
4. Parent and child c1P2(4)
1580, subd. 8.
When minor child's custody is awarded
to one of its parents, probate court need II. Guardian and ward ~25
The statute providing that minor ward's
not find that 'other parent is unfit for child's
marriage
or attainment of majority termincustody, but parent's unfitness must be determined only when child's custody is ates guardianship. where guardian was apawarded to another than one of its parents. pointed solely because of ward's minority,
and that, in all other cases, guardianship is
5. Guardian and ward ~5, 27
terminated only by court's order on guardThe probate court, which originaIly ian's or ward's application after notice to
granted letters of guardianship of minor the other, is inapplicable to removal of
child's person and estate, is authorized by guardian on petition of minor ward's parfor

tody to her was for child's best interest.

IN RE WHITE'S GUARDIANSHIP'
Cite .. 191 p.!c) 466

ent for termination of guardianship and White to go overseas.
award of child's custody to petitioner on
grounds that guardianship is no longer
necessary and that award of custody to
petitioner is for child's best interest. Prc>bate Code, §§ 1580, subd. 8, 1590.

Appeal from Superior Court. Sacramento
County; Peter J. Shields, Judge.

In the matter of the guardianship of the
person and estate of David Theodore White,
Jr., a minor. From an order terminating
the minor's paternal grandmother's guardianship and awarding his custody: to his
mother, the guardian and the minor's father appeal.
Affirmed.
Frank L. Murphy, of Sacramento, for
appellants.
Van Dyke & Harris, J. A. Montgomery
and Leo M. FitzwilIiamj all of Sacramento,
for respondent.
THOMPSON, Justice.
The paternal grandmother of David
Theodore White, Jr., was appointed" guardian of the person and estate of said minor
child, who was two and a half years of age.
Upon subsequent petition of the mother of
the child, which was served on both the
guardian and the father of the 'Child, the
probate court terminated the guardianship,
under Section 1580, subdivision 8, of the
Probate ,Code, and awarded his custody to
his mother. ,From that order both the
guardian and the father have appealed.
The appellants contend that the order is
not supported by the evidence, that the court
was without jurisdiction to terminate the
guardianship, or to award the custody of
the child to the mother without specifically
finding that the father was not a fit or
proper person to assume his custody.
February I, 1942, David Theodore White
and Zelma Maxine Kauffman were married.
Soon thereafter he entered the United States
~ilitary. service and was first st~tioned at
Florence, South Carolina. His wife accompanit!d him to that place. The child in
question was born as issue. of the marria'ge
in 1942. The military service required Mr.

Cat
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The mother then

returned to Sacramento, which was their
former home. She received $100 per month,
and sometimes more, from his compensation
and the Government allotment, as mainte-

nance for herself and their ehild. The
child had no estate. The allowance was insufficient for their maintenance, and the
mother was therefore required to accept
employment. She was then living in Sacramento. To provide for care' of the child
while the mother was working she consented to the appointment of the petitioner,
Thelma V. White, the paternal grandmother, as guardian of the person and estate of
the minor ehild. The letters of guardianship were issued January' 3, 1945. Mr.
White returned to the United States on
January 22, 1945, and was discharged from
military service in July, 1945. His wife
had been keeping company with William S.
Mitcham. He was the father of a girl
born to Zelma White, April 3, 1944. Mr.
White, upon his return, procured a divorce
from Zelma in the State of Nevada in
June, 1945. The decree of divorce made
no provision for the custody of the child,
David Theodore White, Jr. Mr. White
married another woman February 2, 1946.
Zelma White married Mr. Mitcham July
3, 1945. That marriage had the effect of
legitimating their child. (Civil Code, sec.
21S.) Mr. Mitcham and his wife Zelma
immediately established a home at Rio
Linda, near Sacramento, where they now
reside. They are desirous of obtaining
possession and custody of -her son, David.
The petition to terminate the guardianship of David and to recover his custody
was filed .by his mother, _Zelma. in Sacramento, July 11, 1946. Process was served
on both the guardian and Mr. White, who
appeared; answered the petition and participated in the hearing which occurred Octo:ber 30, 1946. Both opposed the petition and
testified as witnesses at the hearing. Mr.
White did not ask for the personal custody
of the child.
The court adopted findings favorable to
the petitioner in accordance with the foregoing statement of facts, determining: That
Zelma, the mother of the child David, consented to the granting of letters of guardilUl-
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ship of the child on account of the necessity
then existing that she was obliged to accept
employment to aid in the maintenance of
herself and said minor; that said necessity
for a guardian no longer exists; that Zelma
and her present husband, Mr. Mitcham, are
now living together in their home and are
desirous of having the custody and control
of the child j that, despite her previous conduct, the mother, Zelma, is a fit and proper
person to have the custody, care and control
of the minor chHd; and that it is for the
best interest of the child that his mother,
Zelma, should assume his custody and control.
The court thereupon ordered that the
letters of guardianship of the person and
estate of the minor child, David, be re..
"oked and terminated. and that he be awarded to the custody and control of his mother,
Zelma Maxine Mitcham. with the privilege
granted to his father to visit him at all reasonable times and places. A motion for
new trial was denied. From the order
terminating the guardianship and awarding
the child to the mother, both the guardian
and Mr. White, the father of the child, have
appealed.
[1,2) We are of the opinion the findings
and order terminating the guardianship and
awarding the custody of the child to his
mother are adequately supported by the
evidence. The probate court determined
(hat guardianship of the child was no longer
necessary, that the mother was a fit and
proper person, to assume his custody, and
that it was for the best interest of the child
to award him to her custody. The fitness
of the mother and the welfare of the child
were direct issues in this proceeding. The
father opposed the awarding of custody to
Zelma, but made no application for the
child's custody in his own behalf. We
assume that the ,father ·was entirely fit and
proper. While the evidence is conflicting
regarding the fitness of the mother, we
are bound by the findings of the court in
that respect. We are satisfied the court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that
it is for the best interest of the child in
awarding him to the custody of the mother.

the Probate Code authorizes the termina..
tion of his guardianship (Probate Code,
sec. 1580, subd. 8), and upon petition therefor, with adequate proof of the fitness of
the parent and the best interest of the child,
in the exercise of its sound discretion the
court may award the custody of the child to
such parent. In the absence of an abuse of
discretion, lWe may not interfere with that
determination. Guardianship of Case, 57
Cal.App.2d 844, 135 P.2d 681; Guardianship of Riley, 72 Cal.App.2d 742, 165 P.2d
555; Guardianship of Russell, 21 Ca1.2d
767, 772, 135 P.2d 369; Warder v. Elkins,
38 Cal. 439, 441; Guardianship of McCoy,
46 Ca1.App.2d 494, 116 P.2d 103; Stever v,
Stever, 6 Cal.2d 166, 56 P.2d 1229.
In the Riley case, supra, under circumstances similar to those of the present pro-ceeding, an order terminating the guardianship On the ground that "it is no longer
necessary" and awarding the custody of the
minor to her mother, who had previously
consented to the guardianship, was affirmed
on appeal. Regarding the discretion of the
probate court to make that order, it is said,
72 CaI.App.2d at page 747, 165 P.2d at page
557: "Since the probate court retains continuing supervisory jurisdiction over guardianship matters, the removal of a guardian for any of the reasons specified in the
code, Prob.Code, § 1580, rests within the
broad discretion of the court, and where,
as in the instant case, the court found that
the mother was a fit and proper person and
concluded that the guardianship was no
longer necessary, the COllrt properly re..
moved the guardian and restored the custody of the child to her mother."

[4) When the application for custody of
a minor child is awarded to one of the parents, it is not necessary to find that the other
parent is unfit for its custody. The unfitness of a parent of a minor child is required
to be determined only when its custody is
awarded to one other than its parents.
Stever v. Stever, supra.

[5] The probate court which originally
grants letters of guardianship is authorized
under Section 1580 of the Probate Code to
remove the guardian of the person and es[3) When it appears that the guardian- tate of a minor child and to appoint another
ship of a minor child is no longer necessary, person in his place, for any of the causes

1N RE WHITE'S GUARDIANSillP
cill' as

J~l

mcntio~e(l in that section .. Guardianship of
tlo.vard,218 Cal. 607,24 P.U 486. In the
eaSe "last cited, in which the father of the
child petitioned for the i discharge of the
mother' as guardian, on the ground that she
"removed from -this state", and to appoint.
him in'the wife's place, the 'court said, 218
Cal. at page 611, 24 P:Zd at page 487: "The
power of the appointing court to direct, re ..
strain, 'and control a guardian in the performance oJ his duties, and even to remove
him, and put another in his place, is settled
beyond corltr8versy. However, 'the' removal
of guardians is not an -arbitrary or capridous, but a judicial, discretion, to .be exer..
cised with due regard' to the legal rights of
all concerned. [Citing authoritjes.]'~ .
[&) In !he presen\ case the mother's petition was not only based on the ground that
the guardianship f'is no longer necessary" ~
but it also asked for the custody of the
minor child on the ground of its welfare.
The fitness of the mother and the welfare
of the infant child were the chief issues in
this case. The probate court retained authority, upon that petition, to determine
what was for the best interest of the child,
and to award its custody accordingly.

[7] In 39 Corpus Juris Secundum,
Guardian and Ward, § SOd, it is said: liThe
court.paving jurisdiction t9 gfan~ letter~ of
guardianship has jurisdiction' to re~oke
them."
[8] In !he matter at !he Guardianship
of Russel, supra, 21 Cal.2d a·t page.7?2,. 135
P.2d at page 371, the Supreme Court said:
"The Probate Court retaiQs a continuing,
~upervisory jurisdiction pver the affairs. of
the estate and the guardian's handling thereof.' ~nd the removal of a guardian for the
reasons specified in the code rests within
that court.'"
the broad discred.9n

of

P.2d486

Cal
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Case, a child nainedLouis was horn in 1935.
The mother died. 'The maternal grandmother took possession of the child and was
appointed 'guardian of the person and estate
in 1937. The father: was' then serving in the
United States Navy. He returned to his
home in 1940 and'laier filed a petition in the
g'Uardianship matte',,; asking the probate
tourt to discharge the guardian, under Sec·
tion 1580 of !he ProhateCode, on the
ground that 'lJ"t is no longer necessary to
have a guardian," and also asked the court
to a ward to him the custody. of the minor
child. The application was contested by the
grandmother. The court found that Uthe
welfare of the minoT ,will best be served by
terminating the guan,lianship and restoring
the child!o his father," [57 Cal.App.Zd 844,
135 P.2d &8Z] The father was found to be
a fit and proper person. ,That order was
made. The guardian appealed. On appeal
the court said : .. "Wb'cit the appointment of
a guardian for m~nor of tender years is
found to be necessary, such appointment is
a duty of the, Supetior, Court. When it
;,lppears.to the co~rt,lhat a,guardianship is
no longer necessary for such ward the court
the guardian. §
must thereupon remrive'
,
1580, subd. 8, Pr.ob.Code. Inasmuch as a
natural parent has s~pt"dor right to the eus·
tody of his child wh'm possessed of such
character as to mak~ him a fit custodian
~ereof,., t1i.e,~~a.son ipr the.~ardianship of
the minor ceases anq Jts continuance is improper. In re Santos' Estate, 185 Cal. 127,
132, 195 P. 1055. $i~ce!he father is competent and has therefore the preferential
right to have the •cus~6dy
of his, child," even
r ",J
,',
.•
though he were .lmpe~umous, the court IS
powerless to mainta.i~ the grandmother as
guardian oi his pertj>n, [Citing authori'I, .
ties.]"

a

[10] ,We conclull. that the Probate
Court, which origin.,!l,. granted the letters
of guardianship of t~,e:person and estate· of
the minor child. -ret~~ed jurisdiction upon
this petition to term~nate the guardianship
on the ground that i~ ;was no longer neees-sary, and to award !he custody of !he ehild
i:
to his mother.

[9] And in 39 Corpus Juris Secundum,
Guardia:n and Ward, § 57, it is said: "The
parent or other relative may by petition seek
the eusfody of the ward,' where the guardian
has contro1."
In the matteraf the Guardianship of Case,
[11] The appell..ntscoittend that' 'the
supra, the essential facts aTe similar to those
of the present case. In that proceeding, as court was 'without 'jurisdiction to terminate
the issue of the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. the guardianship except upon "application
.
,

--------

'---------~---,-,,--,
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of the guardian or the ward." (Prob.Code,
~ec. 1590.) That section provides:
"( 1) Where the appointment of a guard;an was made solely because of the ward's
minority, the marriage of a minor ward
terminates the guardianship of the person;
and the guardianship of the estate of a minor female ward is terminated upon her attaining majority as provided in Section 25
of the Civil Code.
"(Z) If the appointment of a guardian is
made solely because of the ward's minority,
the guardianship is terminated by his attaining majority.
"( 3) In all other eases the guardianship is
terminated only by order of the court upon
application of the guardian or the ward,
.fter such notice to the other as the court or
judge may require." (Italics added.)
\Ve think the foregoing section has no application to the removal of a guardian, upon
petition of a parent of a minor child on the
grounds specified in Section 1580 of the
Probate Code, or for the custody of the
&::hiid by said parent. Section 1590 appar..
(,ntly contemp1ates only the termination of a
guardianship of a minor when the ward
obtains the age of majority or has married,
in either of which events, the application
for termination would naturally be made by
~he guardian or the ward. That construe·
tion is apparent, for the last subdivision of
I..hat section provides that, under such circ;umstances, the order may be made only
"after such notice to the other." The section makes no reference to the awarding of
the custody of a minor to his parents on the
ground that it is for its best interest, or
otherwise. Naturally, the parties most interested in the welfare of a minor, who is to
be relieved of its guardianship, are the parents. The termination of guardianship on
the ground that the ward has attained majority or has married is not induded in Section 1580. Section 1590 is confined to the
termination of guardianships on the grounds
mentioned therein. In the event of the subsequent marriage of a ward, or the attaining
of majority, whether he be a male or a female, it is apparent that both the guardian
and the ward would then be qualified to apply for a termination of the guardianship
upon giving "notice to the other." But
when the gist of the application is for cus-

tody of an infant by a parent, for the best
interest and welfare of the child, under such
circumstances as exist in this case, the limited notice specified by Section 1590, to the
guardian Or ward only, would be utterly inadequate since the other parent, if living,
would be entitled to notice of that proceeding. We conclude that the provisions of
Section 1590, with respect to the parties
who may petition for termination of a
guardianship, and the notice there required,
has no application to Section 1580, or to a
petition for custody of an infant minor.
The order terminating the guardianship
and awarding the custody of the minor
child, David Theodore White, Jr., to his
mother, Zelma Ma."{ine Mitcham, is affirmed.
ADAMS, P. J., and SCHOTTKY,
pro tern., concur.

J.

o ."----~
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T

ZARAGOSA v. CRAVEN ••
Cly. 7448.

District Conrt of Appeal, Third District,
California.
March 30, lwa
Hearing Granted May 27, 1948.
I. Judgment

~93

Final judgment on the merits in actio},
by husband for his injuries sustained in
automobile collision was res judicata of is~
SUes of subsequent action by wife for her
injuries and for special damages sustained
in the same collision, and estopped wife
from maintaining such action, since issues
were identical, and since wife, although not
named as a party plaintiff in husband's action, was in privity with husband because
of her community interest in his cause of
action, and because, if wife recovered, husband would profit to extent of his community interest in the judgment, notwithstanding determination against him On the
merits. Code Civ.Proc. §§ 370, 378, 3R2.
1908. 1910; Civ.Code, ~ 164.
'" Subsequent opinion 202 P.2d 73.

